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The relationship of science to environmental policy is
increasingly contested. Science has never before been so closely linked to
both the discovery of and solution to environmental problems such as
global climate change, the extinction of species, deforestation, decline in
biodiversity, the spread of environmentally related human diseases, and
the management of natural resources. Yet popular and scholarly criticism
of the role of science in environmental policy has risen alarmingly in
recent decades. The objectivity of science is questioned as increasingly it
is funded by businesses that profit from scientific development of new
technologies, the safety of which is controversial. Further, scientists are
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accused of being elitists who use specialized language that is opaque and
uninformative to ordinary citizens concerned about risk and safety.
The four books under review here reflect upon these and other
arguments about the impartiality and democracy of science as it relates
to environment and risk. While each is critical of environmental science
as currently practiced, the authors come from different disciplinary and
philosophical perspectives and their recommendations as to how the role
of science in environmental policy can be improved are noticeably
dissimilar.
The close relationship between science and public policy in the
United States dates back at least to the Progressive Era of the early
twentieth century when Theodore Roosevelt was President of the United
States and Gifford Pinchot was Chief Forester of the redefined U.S.
Forest Service. Their approach to the management of resources was to
support "wise use," to be determined by rational, specialized analysis.
Safeguarding and scientifically managing land, water, and wildlife were
seen as means to meet the needs of a democratic society. The democratic
wish of the progressives was to replace the clash of special interests
haggling over exploitation of natural resources with the objective
decisions of professionals with scientific training. Later, the critical role
played by scientists in winning World War II convinced many that more
great accomplishments could come out of a partnership between science
and government. By. extrapolation, entrenched problems such as poverty
and the dislocating effects of economic cycles were believed to be
amenable to scientifically based solutions. An implicit pact emerged
between science and government in the early 1950s such that scientists
could expect major funding by government and employment of their
graduate students in government jobs in exchange for research
addressing national needs.
The bond between science and government in the environmental
field was reinforced in the 1960s by the rapid development of space
programs and in the 1970s when the public first became aware of and
alarmed by the poisonous effects on living things, including humans, of a
large number of new chemicals being released into the environment.
While it was clear that science itself generated the creation of many of the
new pesticides and food additives that were turning out to be dangerous,
many governmental leaders and others continued to believe that
scientific assessment of potential harms and identification of possible
remedies was the best course of action. Scientific research became part of
the toolkit of both environmental groups and governmental agencies
charged with environmental protection. Since science knew the most
about the properties of new chemicals, it was also skilled at addressing
whether or not new chemical substances constituted a significant threat.
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Quantitative risk assessment became the scientifically based tool of
choice to evaluate issues of risk and safety.
Quantitative risk assessment has evolved into a large-scale
scientific enterprise with graduate programs emerging in a number of
universities, specialists with risk assessment training hired into
government and private enterprise, and the emergence of risk
assessment associations and journals. The scientific identification and
evaluation of risk is intended to make policy choices about risk
management more rational. That is, risks that are both more certain and
more serious are to be distinguished and given higher priority attention
than less likely and less serious threats.
The editors and authors of Risk, Media and Stigma recognize that
public attitudes toward risk are often not rational, at least in the terms
that risk assessment endorses. Instead, the stigmatizing of technologies,
places, and products amplifies risk into something unduly dangerous. In
the reprinted introductory chapter, Robin Gregory, James Flynn, and
Paul Slovic explain that stigma goes beyond normal conceptions of a
hazard rationally compensatible with money and relates to something
that should be shunned. Stigma implies something that is blemished or
tainted beyond reasonable redemption. Risks with certain kinds of
consequences are especially susceptible to stigmatization. Results that are
inequitably distributed, unbounded, and unnatural, affect innocents like
women and children, or result from improper management or actions
are most likely to generate stigma. Extensive media coverage is both the
cause and consequence of stigmatization. Further, stigmatized
technologies, places, and products arouse staunch, persistent, and often
unbeatable opposition.
The creation of stigma is a social rather than a scientific process,
and stigma would seem to be impervious to scientific challenges. In the
second chapter, by Roger Kasperson, Nayna Jhaveri, and Jeanne
Kasperson, a model of the social amplification of risk is presented
including an initiating event, channels of communication, social
institutions and organizations, and signals to society. "Risk ripples"
amplify the extent of impact and involve secondary or tertiary impacts
far beyond the people directly affected. A stigmatized technology, place,
or product is marked or labeled in a highly negative fashion, and this
mark affects identity so that victims see themselves as tainted. This
affects how they behave and how others behave towards them.
In the sections that follow, authors address different case
histories of real world stigma including contamination, nuclear energy,
and stigmatized places, products, and industries. Contagion, as it relates
to stigma is far removed from the exposure/dose/response calculation
underlying quantitative risk assessment, and evokes disgust and moral
outrage that are unamenable to quantification. The contagion related to
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mad cow disease (BSE) is especially telling in that it displays, all the
features relevant to enhancing fear. Cows were fed unnatural and
disgusting foods and became infected with an invidious microscopic
disease that attacks the mind of both the cattle and human consumers of
beef, often after a long latency. The spread of contagion through the
mouth contributes to the aversion. The BSE case illustrates a particular
feature of stigma, that is, the loss of trust. The British public and other
European consumers reacted strongly and emotionally, at least in part in
reaction to the longstanding "official" reassurances that no danger
existed. The loss of trust in authority and expertise is especially notable
in coming to an understanding of how science has been undermined in
terms of authoritative interpretations of risk.
While Risk, Media and Stigma contributes importantly to an
understanding of the social, psychological, and political processes related
to amplification of risk perception beyond what can be scientifically,
justified, most authors implicitly disapprove of the irrationality of
stigma. Their work is intended to inform scientific risk assessments so
that stigmatization may be anticipated and perhaps avoided. Stigma, to
some extent, is viewed as a risk management failure, that is, failure to
understand the political and social context in which the public is
perceiving risk, and to engage in the appropriate risk communication
strategies. In their chapter on coping with stigma, Howard Kunreuther
and Paul Slovic suggest several strategies for dealing with stigma, among
which are reducing perceived risks and their social amplification.
Among their instructions are the education and desensitizing of the
public and informing scientists about the ways in which risk assessments
may unwittingly breed fear. The final two chapters of the book take issue
with the predominant perspective of other authors to the edited volume
that stigma is a threat to more reasonable scientifically based quantitative
risk assessment. Ven Walker notes the difficulty of knowing the
difference between real risk as accurately perceived and stigma. Baruch
Fischoff notes that stigma often reflects a moral statement of what
constitutes acceptable behavior, and when this is the case, attempts to
change or adjust perceptions and behaviors related to stigma assume a
moral superiority on the part of those applying strategies to cope with
stigma. This, he notes, may not be a comfortable or appropriate role for
scientists intending to be objective.
Mary O'Brien, author of Making Better Environmental Decisions:
An Alternative to Risk Management, goes much further in branding
quantitative risk management as inherently biased and in doing so
expresses a strong bias of her own. As with the edited volume reviewed
above, the intended audience for O'Brien's book is those involved in risk
assessment. However, O'Brien is also aiming to inform a more general
public that she would like to mobilize to support a fundamental shift
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toward the adoption of an alternative to quantitative risk assessment.
While the other books in this essay are heavy on theory and references,
Making Better Environmental Decisions is replete with statements of
principles such as, "It is unacceptable to harm humans (or nonhumans)
when there are reasonable alternatives" (p.11), and "We have no choice.
but to change our environmentally bad habits everywhere."(p.13). It'
would be inaccurate to suggest that Mary O'Brien is engaged in moral
philosophy rather than science, however. Much of the book is devoted to
a simplified but often cogent critique of the limitations of quantitative
risk assessment.
The author argues that while scientific studies and science can
help to understand some of the risks and damages caused by particular
substances and activities, science cannot tell how much of a dangerous
substance or activity is safe for humans or the more general ecosystem.
Risk assessors cannot account for all the toxic substances already
contaminating and affecting people and species in the real world. Nor
can they account for individual sensitivities to substances. There are
often adverse effects of a hazardous substance or activity of which
quantitative risk assessments are unaware and therefore fail to calculate.
Moreover, natural systems are so complex and interrelated that it is
extremely difficult to predict multiple, interdependent effects of
cumulative stressors. O'Brien is especially concerned about effects that
are only beginning to be revealed concerning exposure to toxins on
immune and reproductive systems. Further, she warns of alarming new
evidence about effects in the offspring of those exposed to substances,
effects that may not evidence themselves directly to those exposed to
toxins and other hazardous substances.
Despite the mounting evidence about the inadequacies of
quantitative risk assessment, the tool continues to be used because of the
strong interests that support and profit from it. Risk assessments serve
private business interests, she argues, because they are biased in favor of
minimizing risks and provide business with regulatory certainty.
Bureaucracies like quantitative risk assessment because it provides
legitimate rationales for regulatory decisions and routinizes what would
otherwise be difficult decisions. While scientists know the limitations of
risk assessment, they believe that the information informs decisions that
would otherwise be made on purely political grounds, and even though
many of the involved scientists' objectivity is compromised because of
funding from or employment by government and industry. O'Brien
notes that risk assessments contain so many assumptions that they can be
manipulated endlessly to achieve politically preferable results.
Moreover, risk assessment models are so complex that they are
intimidating to citizens and give the upper hand to agencies and
businesses.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 42

While O'Brien's book provides a logical and reasonable basis for
the strong emotional reaction the public sometimes has to risk about
which the authors in Risk, Media and Stigma write, ultimately the critical
reader must remain skeptical. While the author complains about the lack
of objectivity of quantitative risk assessment, her own analysis is driven
so strongly by an agenda that the charge rings somewhat hollow. The
book endorses .something broadly classified as alternatives assessment,
which is envisioned as. a process of considering a range of reasonable
alternatives and their potential environmental, public health, and social
benefits and effects. Among the examples of successful application of
such assessments are the National Environmental Policy Act, the
Endangered Species Act, the Montreal Protocol, and the Massachusetts
Toxic Use Reduction Act. What O'Brien suggests is a change in policy,
process, and decision rules for evaluating risk. O'Brien wants regulation
of toxic and hazardous substances to serve different, much more
environmentally protective goals. Changing or improving the
problematic role in which science finds itself in relation to the
environment is not really a major concern for this author. Science in
relation to the environment is likely to continue to be fiercely contested
even if alternative assessments were widely adopted, except criticisms
would come from different quarters including from most risk assessment
scientists.
In Citizens, Experts, and the Environment: The Politics of Local
Knowledge, Frank Fischer engages in a more fundamental and more
scholarly critique of the role of science in environmental policy. As a
critical political theorist, Fischer relies heavily on critical European and
other internationally based scholars, including among others Ulrich
Beck, Brian Wynne, Anthony Giddens, Jurgen Habermas, Bruno Latour,
and John Dryzek, to reconstruct the concepts of risk, reason, the scientific
process, and democracy. The central argument of the book is that in the
modern risk society, risks are beyond any management regime and
therefore decisions about risk must be made in open, public forums in
which scientists have no larger voices than other citizens. In such a
context, experts come to be understood as no more than a "specialized"
citizen in policy-making processes.
The book is divided into four parts, each of which builds upon
and amplifies arguments introduced earlier. The advantage of this
organization is that the reader is introduced to some rather dense and
difficult philosophical arguments without being put-off as is sometimes
the case with critical theories. The downside is that the book can seem
repetitive, especially for the reader well acquainted with Fischer's other
works including Technocracy and the Politics of Expertise.
How scientists came to dominate decisions concerning
environmental risk is the subject of Part I. The argument rests on two
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important concepts, the first of which is the risk society. Fischer relies
here on the insights of the German Sociologist Ulrich Beck to argue that
governments today face a crisis of legitimacy because while their job is to
insure public welfare and safety and at the same time to promote
technological advance and, material progress, the risks associated with
modern life have gotten out of hand. A fundamental shift in industrial
society has occurred so that the positive production of goods and wealth
has come to be overshadowed by the attendant visible and worrisome
distribution of risk. In this dangerous new world, the state and science
working in tandem are forced into the increasingly untenable positions
of assuring the public of its safety. Contemporary risks cannot simply be
displaced upon the poor and working classes as was once the case with
ordinary industrial risk. Instead, risks from such modem threats'as
global warming, nuclear accidents, and biotechnology gone awry, are felt
by all social groups at the same time. Moreover, these risks are
unmanageable, as evidenced by the fact that they are largely
uninsurable. When insurance has to deal with the possibility of
destruction across the planet, the calculus of casualty, compensation, and
liability becomes impossible and meaningless. Thus, Fischer argues, we
face a paradox. At a time when hazards and catastrophes appear to be
the most nefarious, they slip through the net of attempts by science and
other institutions to capture and remedy them. It is dear that the
combined efforts of environmental bureaucracies and environmental
scientists are simply not adequate. In fact, science itself is the generator
of much of the danger. Whereas science typically seeks reliable
knowledge through experiments, in the case of today's dangerous
technologies, the process is reversed. Before scientists can learn about the
dimensions of such disasters as nuclear melt down or breaches in
biosafety, nuclear reactors must be built, and artificial biotechnical
organisms must be released into the environment. Scientists are in no
position to insure the safety of products or actions until experiments
have taken place and scientists have transformed society itself into its
laboratory.
The second core concept in Citizens, Experts and the Environment
is the postpositivist understanding of knowledge. The argument is
advanced by the insight that all perceptions of the world around us are
filtered through the minds of the perceivers with all their biases, blind
spots, and other limitations. Science with its processes of hypothesis
testing, sophisticated instruments, precise measurement, verification,
and peer review is the best institution humans have to correct for human
limitations. Science is nonetheless a social process in which it is
impossible to separate out meanings and values. Postpositive approaches
to knowledge accept that science offers an account of reality rather than
reality itself. That is not to say there are no real and separate objects of
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inquiry independent of the investigators but instead to recognize that the
vocabularies and concepts used in the effort to know are socially
constructed (p.75). While it might appear that acknowledging that
"facts" are constructed by scientists through networked social processes
would open science up to even more criticism from an already
overwrought public in the risk-society, Fischer argues just the opposite.
One of the principle sources of error and the deterioration of public trust
in science, he maintains, is its overly narrow, disciplinary-based,
fragmented, reductionist studies of environmental risk. The pathway
toward greater acceptance of science in environmental policy making is
to open it up to many physical and social science disciplines bringing
into play a muti-methodological range of intellectual skills both
quantitative and qualitative.
I
Frank Fischer echoes other critical theorists in noting the extent
to which instrumental or technical rationality dominates environmental
decision making. He notes that the many environmental laws adopted
since 1970 have a distinctively technical orientation and they thrust upon
government agencies the burden of scientifically defining acceptable
levels of pollution, pollution abatement, and risk exposure to
environmental pollutants. As a consequence, governmental agencies
have evolved complex mechanisms for the involvement of science in
official decisions. The government/science partnership, he argues, has
tended to exclude the participation of ordinary people through the use of
technical terminology, models, and the other trappings of expertise.
Technicians have employed the utilitarian calculus that empirically
measured consequences rather than social preferences to provide the
appropriate standards for policy making. The science related to the
environment is highly complex, uncertain, and subject to varying
interpretations. The outcome is a politics of counter-expertise where
various interests try to support policy alternatives advantageous to
themselves through testimony of scientists and experts in their employ.
The politics of counter-expertise results in a cacophony of conflicting
voices that provide poor policy guidance and undermine the credibility
of science with the public.
Science controversies in the environmental field have spawned a
search for alternatives to the conflict ridden politics of counter expertise.
Science courts, environmental mediation, and alternative dispute
resolution have been explored with no great success, at least in part
because these tools continue to bias the deliberative process in technical
rather than democratic directions. The heart of Part II develops an
alternative to technical reasoning that Fischer terms cultural reasoning.
Fischer argues that there is often a sound basis for the public reaction to
environmental threats that are branded and dismissed as stigmatization
in the Flynn, Slovic, and Kunreuther volume. Cultural rationality is
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geared to giving equal weight to personal and familiar experiences rather
than depersonalized technical calculations. Focusing on the opinions of
traditional social and peer groups, cultural rationality takes into account
issues of trust, responsiveness, and accountability. It makes sense from a
culturally rational point of view to ask about the institutional and social
affiliation of experts, their reputation for openness and candor and the
extent to which they can be trusted. Procedure becomes as or more
important in discourse about cultural rationality as substance.
Cultural rationality can take its rightful place in environmental
decision making and the current controversies over the role of science in
society can be dampened only if the kind of science conducted on
environmental issues is changed substantially. Part M of Citizens, Experts,
and the Environment concentrates on methods for and examples of
incorporating local knowledge and participatory inquiry into
environmental science. Fischer admits that attempts to meaningfully
involve citizens in research have more often failed than succeeded, and
token involvement is worse than no participation at all. The number of
successes from which Fischer draws lessons is small, and he relies
heavily on experience in Woburn, Massachusetts; Kerala, India; and the
Highland Center in Tennessee. Popular epidemiology and resource
mapping are among the methods discussed and endorsed. Fischer cites
dear evidence that citizens can, if they want, make important
contributions and lend significant insights to the resolution of
environmental problems. He is less convincing in explaining whether or
why such participation can become the norm rather than the exception.
The final part of the book addresses how participatory inquiry
might become institutionalized in social and political life. Attention is
paid to the concept of civic discovery, so much discussed in
contemporary management and public administration literature.
Although Fischer endorses opening up forums for communication, he
finds civic discovery wanting for lack of dear mechanisms to bring the
public into discussions. The Danish "consensus conference" is offered as
a better model. It is a citizen tribunal aiming to inform parliament and
stimulate public discussion of important issues. Participants are chosen
for their interest and representativeness; the group studies a topic for
several months aided by communications facilitators and experts. The
conferences have been effective and influential and have gotten their
recommendations against animal gene technology, food irradiation, and
for a tax on automobiles have been accepted by the parliament, which
respects the conferences' findings.
In order for participatory institutions to make headway, Frank
Fischer suggests that a new field or specialization be adopted that he
labels "policy epistemics." The field would focus on the ways people
communicate across differences, the flow and transformation of ideas
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across borders of different fields, how different groups, including
experts, and local communities, see issues differently, and the ways in
which these differences become the basis for disputes. Such a field would
address many of the difficult issues raised by: Fischer including how to
bridge empirical and normative knowledge and how to include local as
well as abstract forms of knowledge. Uncovering the epistemic dynamics
of public controversies would be the task of this new field and would
allow for an enlightened understanding of what is at stake in disputes
and for more sophisticated evaluation.
The way in which Frank Fischer explains and integrates numbers
of different theories and concepts related to critical approaches to science
is commendable. Whether or not readers are sympathetic to postpositivist perspectives, they are rewarded by learning a great deal about the
subject through clear, well-written prose. The criticism of elitist science
engaged in utilitarian logic is very powerful. However, as is so often the
case with critical theory, the solutions recommended are far less
satisfying than the indictments of present practices. How any alternative
might gain sufficient political power to change the present system is not
satisfactorily explained. Further, the reader is discouraged at the very
few success stories the author is able to cite.
In his book, Agency, Democracy, and Nature: The U.S. Environmental Movement from a-CriticalTheory Perspective, Robert Brulle finds the
roots of contemporary environmental degradation not so much in the
troubled relationship between science and society than in the failure of
social institutions. While Brulle shares much the same criticism of the
scientism that dominates contemporary environmental discourse, he
finds change in the environmental movement to be the most fruitful
pathway toward improvement. Like Fischer, Robert Brulle is a selfconscious academic whose writing is well supported by a rich
bibliography. The author takes his credentials as a sociologist very
seriously, and the non-sociologist reader may be somewhat put off by the
self-conscious attempt to link the present work to that of the great figures
in sociology like Weber and Parsons. At the same time, Robert Brulle's
grounding in sociology leads to very insightful treatment of
environmentalism as a social movement containing a number of often
conflicting discourses. Among the nine different discourses existing
within environmentalism today, Brulle notes the prominence of natural
and health sciences in the conservation,, wildlife management, and the
reform environmentalism discourses. As a consequence, there is an over
reliance on instrumental rationales as opposed to the more values-based
discourses such as ecofeminism, deep ecology, and environmental
justice. The science dependent frames, Brulle argues, tend to distort the
discourse excluding some aspects of the world and limiting the choice of
alternatives. Excessive reliance on technology avoids the political
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discussion that really needs to take, place. The formal discourse of
predominant strands of the environmental movement distances it
through its reliance on technical language and posed neutrality from the
kind of grass roots mobilization that might lead to significant social
learning.
The most original and most useful part of Agency; Democracy, and
Nature is the research on the contemporary environmental movement.
The major contribution of the volume is a framework for evaluating the
environmental movement and new knowledge about environmental
groups including their membership, economic assets, organizational
practices, and the discursive frames with which they are associated. In
the mid 1990s, environmental groups had a total membership of around
41 million. The total number of U.S. environmental organizations is
estimated to be about 10,000, which combined have around 28,000 staff
employees with an annual income of around 2.6 billion dollars and assets
of 5.8 billion. These figures make the environmental movement one of
the largest movements in U.S. history and bigger than other movements
such as the civil rights or the peace movements. Compared to other
nonprofit organizations, the environmental movement has significant
presence in the policy-making process. However, the level of financial
contributions places the environmental movement at a very low level in
comparisons with religious or industrial organizations.
Robert Brulle also provides extraordinarily useful information
about the non-quantitative aspects of the environmental movement. He
explores the history of the emergence of the various discourses within
the environmental movement, reaching much further back than
Earthday 1970, which is often regarded as the beginning of the modem
environmental movement. Brulle shows that the historical baggage of the
wildlife management and conservation movements continue to affect the
framing of issues today. As he traces the various strands of the
environmental movement separated by their distinctive style of
discourse, he assesses what each has to offer in terms of social learning.
He finds that the hierarchical structure of many groups in addition to the
excessive dependence of many organizations upon foundation funding
limits learning capacity. In particular, the lack of democracy and
responsiveness and excessive bureaucratization has blighted democratic
and social learning possibilities. Without question, Agency, Democracy,
and Nature is the best book available on the environmental movement
published in recent years. It is comprehensive, accurate, and theoretically
informed by the most recent theory of social movements.
Robert Brulle places his hopes on the emergence of a
metanarrative, like biodiversity, that might bridge the very different
narratives and discourses that characterize the present day
environmental movement. Such a metanarrative does not imply some
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sort of forced consensus, but instead recognition and inclusion of
multiplicity and particularity. Another critical condition for a rejuvenation of the environmental movement is a change in the excessive control
that foundations currently exercise over environmental groups. While
providing only about one-quarter of environmental groups' budgets,
foundation grants nonetheless exercise undue control over the agendas
and strategies of, groups. They limit the growth of a "green public
sphere" where an open dialogue could take place without some heavily
funded voices drowning out others. Finally, Brulle argues for the
development of,much more democratic structures within environmental
groups where membership plays a greater policy role. Like many other
critics, Brulle strongly faults the slick, commercial-style mass mailing
fund solicitations that lead to excessive turnover of membership among
those only loosely tied to the organization and who contribute only in
terms of sending in money.
The theme of Agency, Democracy, and Nature-the need to reform
social institutions in general and the environmental movement in
particular-shifts the focus of contemporary malaise over environmental
policy away from science. In light of the experience of the last few
decades, and criticism such as provided in the four books reviewed here,
heavy dependence upon scientific advances to resolve environmental
problems appears unwise. The Progressive Era reliance on science to
replace politics and the post-World War H pact between, science and
government to solve problems with science and technology in exchange
for government funding turn out to be misguided thinking that belongs
in the dust bin of history. The solution to contemporary environmental
problems lies not in changing science by changing the rules of evidence,
including lay people in all phases of research, or elevating the status of
ordinary knowledge. It is not so much that science needs democratization, but that democracy itself needs to be made to work better. The heart
of the problem is the lack of adequate institutions and processes through
which to instigate and sustain a productive dialogue over conflicting
environmental and developmental values. Instead of relying on well
functioning political and legal processes, scientists are expected to
provide effective, efficient, and politically feasible answers to difficult
dilemmas. The answer to such problems probably lies less in creating
some kind of civic or participatory science than in constructing a more
robust democracy. Elected politicians should not be able to escape their
responsibilities to facilitate value discussions and ultimately make
difficult value choices by simply using the standard of "best available
science" to justify decisions made. Scientists should not be used as the
fall guys for bad decisions and then blamed for their overweening
power. Instead, what is necessary is much more democratic politics.
Among the books reviewed here, Agency, Democracy and Nature by
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Robert Brulle does the best job in scouting out fruitful directions for
political and institutional change.
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Desert Ecology. An Introduction to Life in the Arid Southwest. By John
Sowell. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2001. Pp. 192. $17.95
paper.
This small book, 6" X 9" and 192 pages, is organized into nine
chapters. An opening chapter describes the general features of deserts,
two chapters treat plants (adaptations to arid conditions, life histories),
three cover animals (thermoregulation, osmoregulation, life histories),
one discusses desert ecosystems (food webs, productivity), one describes
desert mountains (the "sky islands" of the Southwest), and one chapter
discusses humans living in desert environments.
This is a book worth reading if you are a novice to deserts and
their ecology. It is largely well written, with a reasonable dose of "desert
lore," some appropriate quotes, and good opening passages for each
chapter. However, it treats the broad subject of deserts somewhat
unevenly, and the writing could have benefited by some careful editing.
The opening chapter, with which most authors would hope to
"hook" their readers, is rather unpolished. It starts strong, with a vivid
description of Death Valley. But then, little-by-little, the writing becomes
rather cumbersome. The information is generally there, it just isn't
always precise or easily extracted due to the uneven writing. Terms are
used without definition (e.g., playa, arroyo), allusions are attempted that
don't always work (e.g., "oceanic deserts"), and examples are sometimes
confusing (e.g., the coastal chaparral of Baja California seems to be
treated as a desert, even though the map of southwestern deserts dearly
excludes it, as well it should be).
The plant and animal chapters are probably the strongest,
though showing a dear bias toward physiology over ecology and
evolutionary biology. The coverage of plant physiology is excellent, and
the discussion of CAM C4 photosynthesis (a difficult topic about which
to write) is one of the dearest I've read. However, the discussion of
halophytes is so superficial as to be of little use. The chapter on plant life
histories is generally well done, although it is, again, rather uneven.
Sometimes Latin names of plants are parenthetically provided, other
times not; readers unfamiliar with names like "saguaro" and "cardon"
may not recognize these as cacti. Given the unevenness of the text, a
glossary would have made this book far more useful. It could also have
benefited by inclusion of a table listing common and scientific names of

